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ADDING TO THE LIST: THE LATEST  
DEVELOPMENT IN THE ANOMALOUS  
SEVENTH CIRCUIT SUBSTANTIAL  
COMPLIANCE APPROACH 
Abstract: In March 2017, in Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A., 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its position to allow 
substantial compliance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(“Rule 11”). In so doing, the Seventh Circuit remains the only circuit to allow for 
substantial compliance with Rule 11, rather than require a strict adherence ap-
proach. The Seventh Circuit’s approach, however, runs counter to Rule 11’s plain 
language and undermines the policy goals of the rule. This Comment argues that 
the Seventh Circuit should require parties to strictly adhere to Rule 11’s require-
ments to alleviate concerns that arise from the substantial compliance approach. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) were first adopted in 
1938.1 Rule 11 of the FRCP (“Rule 11”) governs court-imposed sanctions 
against attorneys, law firms, and parties involved in litigation.2 Since Rule 11’s 
implementation, it has been amended twice and remains one of the most con-
troversial rules of the FRCP.3 Rule 11 requires “every pleading, written mo-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1004, Westlaw 
(database updated Apr. 2018) (outlining the history of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(“FRCP”)). The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, which is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072, authorized 
the U.S. Supreme Court to create a set of procedural rules for federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 
(2012); Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1024 n.3 
(1982). In 1935, an Advisory Committee appointed by the U.S. Supreme Court consisting of law pro-
fessors and practitioners drafted a unified set of procedural rules. See 4 WRIGHT ET AL., supra, 
§ 1004. The FRCP were a result of a three-year-long endeavor involving multiple revisions based on 
feedback from various government agencies, committees of bar associations, and individuals. See id. 
In 1937, the FRCP were endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court. See id. The following year, Congress 
also endorsed them and the FRCP were given legal effect on September 16, 1938. See id. 
 2 FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 3 See Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision to Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171, 171 (1994) (explain-
ing that the Rule 11 amendments attempted to resolve problems that arose from the implementation of 
the rule). The 1938 version of Rule 11 stated, in relevant part, that “[i]f a pleading is not signed or is 
signed with intent to defeat the purpose of the rule, it may be stricken as sham and false . . . . For a 
willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action.” 5A 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 1331 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1938)). Rule 11 was first amended 
in 1983 and again in 1993. See Stephen R. Ripps & John N. Drowatzky, Federal Rule 11: Are the 
Federal District Courts Usurping the Disciplinary Function of the Bar?, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 67, 67 
(1997). Disagreement over how to best implement sanctions without stifling advocacy stems from the 
history and effect of Rule 11. See Edward D. Cavanagh, Mandating Rule 11 Sanctions? Here We Go 
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tion, and other paper” be signed by an attorney.4 Under Rule 11, a motion for 
sanctions must be submitted separately from other motions and must describe 
the alleged wrong conduct.5 Finally, before a Rule 11 motion is filed with the 
court, the aggrieved party must serve the motion to the opposing party and al-
low the opposing party twenty-one days to alleviate the alleged offending mat-
ter.6 If the party served with a Rule 11 motion resolves the matter within twen-
ty-one days, the moving party cannot submit the motion to the court.7 Because 
this provision allows an offending party to take corrective action before the 
matter goes to the court, it has been referred to as the “warning-shot/safe-
harbor” provision.8 Each U.S. Court of Appeals except for the Seventh Circuit 
requires that parties strictly adhere to the requirements under Rule 11.9 In con-
trast, the Seventh Circuit has espoused a more liberal approach, requiring only 
that parties substantially comply with the Rule 11 requirements.10 
In March 2017, in Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A. 
(“NITEL III”), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the 
defendant’s settlement demands fell short of substantial compliance with Rule 
11 and thus did not satisfy the warning-shot/safe-harbor requirements of the 
rule.11 The defendants believed that their settlement letters, which contained 
threats to seek Rule 11 sanctions, substantially complied with Rule 11 and 
                                                                                                                           
Again!, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 31, 34 (2017), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1081&context=wlulr-online [https://perma.cc/NC29-LZK5] (arguing that a 
bill in the House of Representatives that would essentially restore Rule 11 to its 1983 version is a “bad 
idea”); Sandra Davidson, FRCP 11: A Wounded Remedy for Unethical Behavior, 62 J. MO. B. 16, 17 
(2006) (questioning whether the current Rule 11 is too liberal). 
 4 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a). Requiring the attorney’s signature ensures that the information presented 
in pleadings, motions, and other papers was gathered by a reasonable inquiry and in good faith. See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). The court may impose Rule 11 sanctions if the court determines that a party did 
not conduct a reasonable inquiry and act in good faith. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1). 
 5 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2). 
 6 See id. (providing that Rule 11 motions must be served pursuant to FRCP Rule 5, and cannot be 
filed with the court within twenty-one days after service, which allows time for the offending matter 
to be resolved). Rule 5 of the FRCP provides in part that it is permissible to serve the opposing party 
by giving the papers to them in person, leaving the papers with someone at their office, or mailing the 
papers to them. See FED. R. CIV. P. 5(b)(2). 
 7 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2); N. Ill. Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A. (NITEL III), 850 F.3d 
880, 882 (7th Cir. 2017) (describing the requisite twenty-one-day period as the warning-shot/safe-
harbor requirement). 
 8 See NITEL III, 850 F.3d at 882 (“[T]he party seeking sanctions must fire a warning shot that 
gives the opponent time to find a safe harbor.”). 
 9 See NITEL III, 850 F.3d at 887 (stating that only the Seventh Circuit allows for substantial com-
pliance with the Rule 11 requirements to be sufficient); Penn, LLC v. Prosper Bus. Dev. Corp., 773 
F.3d 764, 768 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting that the Seventh Circuit’s approach has not been adopted by any 
other circuit). 
 10 See NITEL III, 850 F.3d at 888 (reaffirming that Seventh Circuit precedent allows for substan-
tial compliance with Rule 11). 
 11 See id. at 882 (holding that the defendants did not substantially comply with Rule 11). 
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would effectively be substituted for Rule 11 sanction motions.12 In NITEL III, 
the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its position as the only circuit to allow substan-
tial compliance with Rule 11 rather than require a strict adherence approach.13 
The substantial compliance approach, however, can lead to confusion for par-
ties involved in litigation and runs counter to the clear-cut strict adherence ap-
proach adopted by the other circuits.14 
This Comment argues that because the Seventh Circuit’s analysis is con-
trary to both the plain language of Rule 11 and the policy goals the rule was 
meant to advance, the Seventh Circuit should instead require strict adherence 
with Rule 11.15 Part I of this Comment examines the history and practical pro-
cedure of Rule 11 and provides the facts and procedural background of NITEL 
III.16 Part II of this Comment addresses the Seventh Circuit’s approach to Rule 
11 and contrasts it with how other circuits interpret Rule 11.17 Part III of this 
Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit should adopt a strict adherence ap-
proach to Rule 11 due to the rule’s plain language and underlying policy.18 
I. HOW WE GOT HERE: THE HISTORY OF RULE 11 AND NITEL III 
Rule 11 sets forth guidelines for when and how courts can impose sanc-
tions against attorneys.19 The main purpose of Rule 11 is to act as a deterrent in 
preventing frivolous litigation.20 This purpose, however, must be balanced with 
the reality that parties may bring fewer actions and convey less creative argu-
ments out of fear of being sanctioned.21 Over a sixty-four-year period, the Ad-
visory Committee on the FRCP has amended Rule 11 twice in an attempt to 
reach its goal of successfully deterring frivolous litigation without also pre-
                                                                                                                           
 12 See id. at 888 (“The Rule 11 threats did not transform PNC Bank’s settlement offers into com-
munications that substantially complied with Rule 11(c)(2) warning-shot/safe-harbor requirements”). 
 13 See id. at 887–88. Although the Seventh Circuit ultimately decided NITEL III without revisit-
ing the substantial compliance approach, the court intimated en banc or U.S. Supreme Court review 
could be in the future. See id. at 888 n.5. 
 14 See id. at 887–88 (stating that a substantial compliance approach to Rule 11 is difficult to rec-
oncile with the requirements of the rule). Much of the court’s opinion in NITEL III is spent criticizing 
the substantial compliance approach, despite the fact that the court ultimately declined to overrule its 
precedent. See id. 
 15 See infra notes 19–154 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 19–71 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 72–120 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 121–154 and accompanying text. 
 19 See Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 943, 946–
47 (1992) (explaining that Rule 11 gives the court authority to apply sanctions). 
 20 See Cavanagh, supra note 3, at 33 (clarifying that Rule 11 sanctions should be applied as a 
deterrent). 
 21 See Danielle Kie Hart, Still Chilling After All These Years: Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and Its Impact on Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs After the 1993 Amendments, 37 
VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002) (noting that the “Rule 11 sanctions chilled creative advocacy by deterring 
[parties] from filing meritorious claims in federal court”). 
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venting parties from formulating innovative arguments.22 Section A of this Part 
provides a brief historical outline of the evolution of Rule 11.23 Section B of 
this Part provides an outline of how parties can bring a Rule 11 motion for 
sanctions.24 Section C of this Part discusses the facts and procedural history of 
NITEL III, which concerns the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Rule 11’s 
requirements.25 
A. A Historical Overview of Rule 11 
Rule 11 was originally drafted by the Advisory Committee to deter frivo-
lous litigation.26 The original drafting of Rule 11 provided that sanctions were 
discretionary, and thus Rule 11 sanctions were rarely invoked.27 The original 
1938 version of Rule 11 permitted district courts to use a subjective standard to 
impose sanctions against a party who willfully violated the rule or if the plead-
ing was a “sham.”28 The collective reluctance of courts to impose sanctions 
under this standard, however, rendered Rule 11 ineffective at deterring litiga-
tion abuse and eventually led to an amendment of Rule 11 in 1983.29 
The 1983 modification adopted an objective reasonableness standard for 
determining violations and required the court to impose Rule 11 sanctions 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See Hart, supra note 21, at 2–3 (arguing that the intended effects of Rule 11 have not been 
realized); Jeffrey A. Parness, Disciplinary Referrals Under New Federal Civil Rule 11, 61 TENN. L. 
REV. 37, 40–43 (1993) (outlining the goals that the 1993 amendment was intended to achieve). 
 23 See infra notes 26–39 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 40–54 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 55–71 and accompanying text. 
 26 See Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Ending Illegitimate Advocacy: Reinvigorating Rule 11 Through 
Enhancement of the Ethical Duty to Report, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1555, 1562–63 (2001) (explaining that 
Rule 11’s potential imposition of sanctions acts as a deterrence tool). 
 27 See id. at 1565; D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some “Strik-
ing” Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 34–35 (1976) (revealing 
that between 1938 and 1976, Rule 11 was only reportedly used twenty-three times). The rule was 
discretionary because it merely allowed, rather than required, courts to impose sanctions for willful 
violations. See 5A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 1, § 1331 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1938)). Courts 
were hesitant to sanction lawyers because the rule focused on willful violations and whether the plead-
ing had support to the best of the lawyer’s knowledge, both of which were, and still are, difficult for 
courts to determine. See Marshall et al., supra note 19, at 947–48. Further, when Rule 11 was first adopt-
ed, there was also confusion over when the rule could be applied and the appropriate triggers. See 
Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 191 (1988). 
 28 See Annette M. Wilson, Rule 11 Sanctions Revisited: Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corpo-
ration, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 45, 49–52 (1992) (providing an overview of the 1938 version of 
Rule 11). 
 29 See Theodore C. Hirt, A Second Look at Amended Rule 11, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1007, 1009 
(1999) (opining that Rule 11 was not effective because of confusion regarding, among other things, 
the availability of the rule and the standard of conduct to which attorneys would be held). The Adviso-
ry Committee Notes specify that the primary reason for the amendment was to reduce the reluctance 
of courts to impose sanctions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment. 
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when a violation occurred.30 The 1983 amendment caused an “explosion of 
satellite litigation,” with parties using the threat of Rule 11 sanctions as a liti-
gation tool.31 Many commentators believed that the threat of Rule 11 sanctions 
deterred the formulation of innovative arguments by preventing attorneys from 
pursuing novel, yet worthy, claims due to fear of sanctions.32 In 1990, in re-
sponse to substantial criticism, the Advisory Committee requested public 
comment regarding how to amend Rule 11.33 After several hearings and pre-
liminary drafts, the U.S. Supreme Court submitted the second Rule 11 amend-
ment to Congress in 1993.34 
The 1993 amendment made numerous changes to Rule 11.35 The amend-
ment clarified that the only ways to bring a Rule 11 sanctions request were ei-
ther by the court on its own initiative or by a motion by the aggrieved party.36 
A Rule 11 motion for sanctions must be filed separately from other motions 
and requests and must describe the specific conduct alleged to violate Rule 
11.37 The Rule 11 motion for sanctions cannot be filed with the court, however, 
if the challenged claim is either withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 
twenty-one days of serving the motion to the opposing party pursuant to the 
warning-shot/safe-harbor provision.38 Further, Rule 11’s current form does 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See Brown, supra note 26, at 1567. This change required judges to inquire into what the attor-
ney should have known, not what the attorney actually knew. See Marshall et al., supra note 19, at 
948–49; Herbert Kritzer et. al., Rule 11: Moving Beyond the Cosmic Anecdote, 75 JUDICATURE 269, 
269 (1992). 
 31 See Brown, supra note 26, at 1567 & n.39 (explaining that parties used Rule 11 sanction threats 
as a litigation tactic, even when the pleading was not frivolous, to scare the opposing party from con-
tinuing litigation). Satellite litigation consists of ancillary proceedings that are related to the original 
litigation, but stand on their own ground. See William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Fed-
eral Rule 11—A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 183 (1985). Over seven thousand published opinions 
discussed Rule 11 sanctions during the ten-year period between the 1983 and 1993 amendments. See 
Brown, supra note 26, at 1568. Further, evidence suggests that plaintiffs were far more likely than 
defendants to be recipients of Rule 11 motions. See id.; Hart, supra note 21, at 13. 
 32 See Brown, supra note 26, at 1569 (arguing that the 1983 Rule 11 amendment was an overcorrec-
tion); Hart, supra note 21, at 11 (asserting that Rule 11 suppressed the development of the common law 
because it constrained creative lawyering due to fear of being sanctioned); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: 
Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 484 (1991) (asserting that a statisti-
cal analysis shows that Rule 11 “‘chills’ vigorous advocacy”). 
 33 See Hirt, supra note 29, at 1011. The majority of the responses criticized the mandatory sanc-
tions imposed by the 1983 amendment to Rule 11. See Carl Tobias, supra note 3, at 179. 
 34 See Tobias, supra note 3, at 176, 177, 186. 
 35 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (stating that the purpose 
of the amendment was to “remedy problems that have arisen in the interpretation and application of 
the 1983 revision of the rule”); Hart, supra note 21, at 27. 
 36 See Hart, supra note 21, at 27. 
 37 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2). 
 38 See id. (providing a twenty-one day safe-harbor for parties prior to filing a Rule 11 motion for 
sanctions with the court). 
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away with mandatory sanctions, thereby reinstituting judges’ discretion in ap-
plying sanctions.39 
B. Filing a Rule 11 Motion 
Rule 11 provides the necessary process to bring a successful motion for 
sanctions.40 The rule requires attorneys to sign every pleading, written motion, 
or other paper presented to the court.41 The signature certifies that, to the best 
of the attorney’s knowledge, they conducted a reasonable inquiry to determine 
the validity of their asserted claims.42 This certification ensures that the items 
being presented to the court are not being brought for an improper purpose.43 
Thus, a Rule 11 motion for sanctions can only be brought if a party believes 
that the opposing counsel did not conduct a reasonable inquiry when asserting 
a claim or that the claim was brought for an improper purpose.44 
If a party believes that the opposing litigants violated one of the provi-
sions of Rule 11(b), they can begin the process of requesting sanctions.45 The 
allegedly aggrieved party must initiate a separate motion describing the wrong-
ful conduct and must serve the motion to the allegedly offending party pursu-
ant to Rule 5 of the FRCP.46 The allegedly aggrieved party, however, cannot 
file the motion to the court for twenty-one days.47 The purpose of this twenty-
one day period is to allow the allegedly offending party to correct the claims 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1) (providing the court “may impose” sanctions for Rule 11 viola-
tions). The removal of mandatory sanctions has received mixed reactions. See Cavanagh, supra note 
3, at 34–35 (opining that mandatory sanctions are detrimental to litigation and that there is no factual 
basis for assuming mandatory sanctions deter frivolous lawsuits); Tobias, supra note 3, at 186 (de-
scribing the dissent to the 1993 amendment by U.S. Supreme Court Justices Scalia and Thomas that 
argued that without mandatory sanctions, Rule 11 would become “toothless”). 
 40 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2) (explaining how a party can bring a Rule 11 motion for sanctions). 
 41 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a) (explaining that any paper presented to the court must be certified). 
Individuals without representation must personally sign the paper. See id. 
 42 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (stating that all papers submitted to the court must be done so only 
after a reasonable inquiry that certifies the claims are not frivolous). 
 43 See Douglas J. Pepe, Persuading Courts to Impose Sanctions, AM. B. ASS’N (2010), https://
apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/trial_skills/080310-tips-federal-sanctions-law.html 
[https://perma.cc/TBZ9-YX4F] (stating that papers cannot be brought for an improper purpose). 
 44 See id. (explaining that the act of presenting documents to the court certifies that a reasonable 
inquiry was made and the documents are not being brought for an improper purpose). 
 45 See Sam Glover, Dealing with Rule 11 Threats and Motions, LAWYERIST.COM (Mar. 16, 
2014), https://lawyerist.com/dealing-with-rule-11-threats-and-motions/ [https://perma.cc/N8CV-
H56K] (explaining the difference between threatening to seek sanctions and actually serving a motion 
for sanctions). 
 46 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2). A separate motion is required to stress the seriousness of the action. 
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. 
 47 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2). 
2018] Substantial Compliance Under FRCP 11 415 
prior to the imposition of sanctions.48 The motion can only be submitted to the 
court once this twenty-one day safe-harbor period has passed and the offending 
matter has not been resolved.49 If the court determines a Rule 11(b) violation 
occurred and sanctions are warranted, the court will hold the law firm and the 
attorney jointly and severally liable for the damages.50 
The court also has the authority to impose sanctions on its own accord.51 
The court can order a party to show why a specific claim or action did not vio-
late one of the substantive provisions of Rule 11.52 Further, sanctions are not 
limited to strictly monetary punishments; the court has the discretion to deter-
mine the precise nature of the sanction.53 Finally, Rule 11 sanctions should 
only be imposed as a deterrence and only to the extent necessary to prevent 
recurrence of the conduct.54 
C. Facts and Procedural History of NITEL III 
In 2007, a corporation known as Nexxtworks, Inc. (“Nexxtworks”) was 
hired to upgrade the communications facilities of two banking institutions in 
the Chicago area.55 Upon receiving the contract, Nexxtworks subcontracted 
Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. (“NITEL”) to perform the data and telephone 
installations.56 NITEL performed the work, but alleged that it did not receive 
its full payment of $81,300 from Nexxtworks.57 Soon after, Nexxtworks filed 
for bankruptcy and PNC Bank, N.A. (“PNC”) bought the original banks where 
NITEL performed the work.58 In 2012, after NITEL failed to recover the 
                                                                                                                           
 48 See Marguerite L. Butler, Rule 11—Sanctions and a Lawyer’s Failure to Conduct Competent 
Legal Research, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 681, 701 n.111 (2002) (explaining that the twenty-one-day period 
provides a safe-harbor for parties to correct the offending matter without repercussions). 
 49 See NITEL III, 850 F.3d at 882 (“To mix naval metaphors, the party seeking sanctions must fire 
a warning shot that gives the opponent time to find a safe harbor.”). 
 50 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1). 
 51 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(3). 
 52 Id. 
 53 See JEROLD S. SOLOVY ET AL., SANCTIONS UNDER RULE 11, at 136 (Jenner & Block Practice 
Series 2010) (explaining that the nature of the sanction is generally left up to the courts). 
 54 See C. William Phillips, The Law and Tactics of Sanctions, in BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, 
LEGAL ETHICS FOR IN-HOUSE CORPORATE COUNSEL, at A-87 (Corporate Practice Series 2007) (ex-
plaining that the focus of sanctions shifted from compensation to deterrence via the 1993 amend-
ments). 
 55 See N. Ill. Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, NA (NITEL I), No. 12C2372, 2014 WL 4244069, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2014) (explaining that Nexxtworks, Inc. (“Nexxtworks”) was subcontracted by 
Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. (“NITEL”) to install data and telephone cabling in a pair of Chicago 
banks). 
 56 See id. By 2012, the two banks being upgraded were acquired by PNC Bank, N.A. (“PNC”). 
See NITEL III, 850 F.3d at 882. 
 57 See NITEL III, 850 F.3d at 882. In 2009, before the dispute was resolved, Nexxtworks filed for 
bankruptcy. See id. 
 58 See id. (explaining that NITEL’s bankruptcy claim was disallowed because they did not timely 
file a proof of claim). 
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amount it was owed during Nexxtworks’s bankruptcy proceedings, NITEL 
filed a breach of contract lawsuit against PNC.59 
At the onset of litigation, PNC attempted to settle the case via a letter sent 
to NITEL in which PNC provided NITEL eight days to dismiss the suit and 
pay for PNC’s fees and costs.60 The letter asserted that there was no contract 
between PNC and NITEL, provided NITEL five days to respond, and warned 
that PNC would seek Rule 11 sanctions if NITEL failed to abide by the terms 
of the offer.61 NITEL did not respond to PNC’s letter and discovery subse-
quently began.62 After discovery, PNC’s lawyers sent a second settlement offer 
asserting NITEL’s suit was frivolous.63 The second letter asked for a written 
acceptance of the terms within six days and repeated that PNC would seek 
Rule 11 sanctions if NITEL did not agree because NITEL did not have a legit-
imate contract with PNC.64 NITEL still refused to concede, prompting PNC to 
move for summary judgment.65 In August 2014, in Northern Illinois Telecom, 
Inc. v. PNC Bank, NA (“NITEL I”), the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois granted PNC’s motion for summary judgment on the 
grounds that NITEL failed to submit any evidence establishing a valid contract 
between the parties.66 
Upon receiving summary judgment, PNC filed a motion in the Northern 
District of Illinois seeking sanctions against NITEL under Rule 11.67 In April 
2015, in Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, NA (“NITEL II”), the 
Northern District of Illinois upheld PNC’s Rule 11 motion because PNC’s two 
letters substantially complied with the warning-shot/safe-harbor requirements 
of Rule 11(c)(2).68 The court further concluded that sanctions were justified 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See id. (explaining that NITEL asked for $81,300, plus fees and costs). 
 60 See id. at 888. The letter explained that there was no contract between PNC and NITEL. See 
NITEL I, 2014 WL 4244069, at *4. The letter asked for $9,195 for PNC’s fees and costs. See NITEL 
III, 850 F.3d at 888. 
 61 See NITEL III, 850 F.3d at 888 (explaining the terms of the settlement demand letter). 
 62 See N. Ill. Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, NA (NITEL II), No. 12 C 2372, 2015 WL 1943271, at 
*1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2015), rev’d 850 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2017). During discovery, PNC continued to 
assert that there was no contract between PNC and NITEL and that, accordingly, the lawsuit was 
frivolous. See id. at *2. 
 63 See NITEL III, 850 F.3d at 888. PNC demanded NITEL dismiss its lawsuit and pay $24,000 for 
PNC’s costs. See id. 
 64 See id. (describing PNC’s second settlement demand letter). 
 65 See id. at 882 (explaining that PNC removed the case to Federal jurisdiction prior to moving 
for summary judgement). 
 66 See NITEL I, 2014 WL 4244069, at *5. The court agreed with PNC, finding that NITEL’s con-
tract was with Nexxtworks. See id. at *4. 
 67 See NITEL II, 2015 WL 1943271, at *3 (holding that sanctions were justified because NITEL’s 
claims had been “baseless”). 
 68 See id. at *4. In its analysis, the court noted that Seventh Circuit precedent allows for substan-
tial compliance with Rule 11 because strict adherence may not be possible. See id. The court reasoned 
that both of PNC’s letters were warning-shots, and because NITEL did not respond during litigation, 
NITEL could not be afforded another opportunity to correct the claims. See id. 
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under Rule 11 and awarded PNC attorney fees and costs incurred in defending 
against NITEL’s claims.69 The sanctions were imposed jointly and severally 
against NITEL and its attorney, Robert G. Riffner.70 Consequently, NITEL and 
Riffner appealed the imposition of sanctions to the Seventh Circuit.71 
II. DIFFERENT STROKES FOR DIFFERENT FOLKS: APPROACHES TO RULE 11 
Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that 
substantial compliance with Rule 11 satisfies the requirements of the rule, most 
other circuits require strict adherence.72 Moreover, the plain language of Rule 
11 and the Advisory Committee Notes suggest that strict adherence is required 
so that the underlying policy goals of Rule 11 are fulfilled.73 Section A of this 
Part analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s substantial compliance precedent.74 Section 
B of this Part examines the Seventh Circuit’s 2017 decision in Northern Illi-
nois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A. (“NITEL III”).75 Section C of this Part 
compares the Seventh Circuit’s substantial compliance approach with the strict 
adherence approach adopted by other circuits.76 
A. The Seventh Circuit’s Substantial Compliance Approach 
In June 2003, in Nisenbaum v. Milwaukee County, the Seventh Circuit 
first adopted the substantial compliance approach to Rule 11.77 In Nisenbaum, 
the defendants sent a letter, as opposed to a motion, outlining the defects in the 
plaintiffs’ claims and provided the plaintiffs more than twenty-one days to al-
leviate the offending matter.78 The Seventh Circuit held that the motion was 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See id. at *4, *5; see also NITEL III, 850 F.3d at 882. The court agreed with PNC’s assertions, 
holding that NITEL knew Nexxtworks, and not PNC, was contractually obligated to pay for NITEL’s 
work. See NITEL II, 2015 WL 1943271, at *5, 7. 
 70 See NITEL II, 2015 WL 1943271, at *9. The sanction amount was $84,325. See NITEL III, 850 
F.3d at 883. Under Rule 11(c)(1), a court may impose sanctions jointly and severally on attorneys, law 
firms, and parties who violate the rule. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1). 
 71 See NITEL III, 850 F.3d at 883. Because NITEL was eventually dismissed as an appellant, the 
Seventh Circuit heard only Riffner’s appeal. See id. 
 72 See N. Ill. Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A. (NITEL III), 850 F.3d 880, 887 (7th Cir. 2017) 
(asserting that the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, 
and Tenth Circuits have all explicitly rejected the substantial compliance approach used in the Seventh 
Circuit). Only the Seventh Circuit allows for substantial compliance and not strict adherence with 
Rule 11’s requirements. See Penn, LLC v. Prosper Bus. Dev. Corp., 773 F.3d 764, 768 (6th Cir. 
2014). 
 73 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2); FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. 
 74 See infra notes 77–86 and accompanying text. 
 75 See infra notes 87–108 and accompanying text. 
 76 See infra notes 109–120 and accompanying text. 
 77 See Nisenbaum v. Milwaukee Cty., 333 F.3d 804, 808 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that substantial-
ly complying with Rule 11 qualified the parties to a decision on the merits of the motion). 
 78 See id. The magistrate judge stated that the defendants failed to comply with the technical re-
quirements of Rule 11 because they sent a “letter” or “demand” rather than “motion.” Id. The Seventh 
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only a technical requirement and that the letter satisfied the purpose of Rule 
11.79 Thus, in effect, the letter served the same function as a motion.80 Because 
the defendant’s letter explained the grounds for sanctions and provided more 
than twenty-one days to remedy the problem, the court reasoned the letter sat-
isfied the intent of Rule 11 and proceeded to decide whether sanctions were 
warranted on the merits of the case.81 
The Seventh Circuit further clarified the substantial compliance require-
ment in 2011, in Matrix IV, Inc. v. American National Bank and Trading Co. of 
Chicago (“Matrix IV”).82 In Matrix IV, the defendants sent the plaintiffs a let-
ter asserting they would seek sanctions if the plaintiffs did not dismiss their 
lawsuit.83 The letter was sent two weeks after the initial complaint was filed 
and outlined the basis for sanctions.84 Upon dismissal of the case two years 
later, the defendants filed for Rule 11 sanctions.85 Following the precedent set 
forth in Nisenbaum, the Seventh Circuit held that the letter substantially com-
plied with the warning-shot/safe-harbor requirement.86 
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Approach to NITEL III 
In March 2017, in Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, NA (“NI-
TEL III”), the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s award of sanctions.87 
                                                                                                                           
Circuit disagreed, stating that the magistrate judge should have heard the defendant’s request for Rule 
11 sanctions and ultimately held that the defendants substantially complied with Rule 11 and thus 
deserved a decision on the merits. See id. at 811; see also NITEL III, 850 F.3d at 887. 
 79 See Nisenbaum, 333 F.3d at 808 (explaining that because the “defendants alerted Nisenbaum to 
the problem and gave him more than [twenty-one] days to desist,” the defendants substantially com-
plied with Rule 11). 
 80 See NITEL III, 850 F.3d at 887 (noting that the requirement of a formal motion is “unduly 
formalistic”); Nisenbaum, 333 F.3d at 808. 
 81 See NITEL III, 850 F.3d at 887; Nisenbaum, 333 F.3d at 808 (holding that the defendants sub-
stantially complied with Rule 11). 
 82 See Matrix IV, Inc. v. Am. Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi. (Matrix IV), 649 F.3d 539, 552–53 (7th 
Cir. 2011). 
 83 See id. (explaining the details of the defendant’s letter). 
 84 See id. at 552 & n.5 (implying, in the letter, that a final judgment in a preceding bankruptcy 
matter precluded the plaintiffs’ claim and warning that the defendants would seek Rule 11 sanctions if 
the opposing party did not voluntarily dismiss its claims). 
 85 See id. The Seventh Circuit first addressed the timing of the request, holding that parties had 
ninety days after final judgment to seek Rule 11 sanctions. See id. at 552–53. In this case, the defend-
ants filed twenty-three days after final judgment. See id. at 553. 
 86 See id. at 552–53. The court held that, following Nisenbaum, a letter that outlines the basis for 
sanctions and notifies the opposing party of their intent to seek sanctions substantially complies with 
Rule 11. See id. The warning-shot/safe-harbor requirement gives the offending party a twenty-one-day 
period to withdraw or correct the offending matter. See id. at 553. Ultimately, however, the court 
found that although the defendant’s letter satisfied the requirements of Rule 11, sanctions were unjus-
tified on the merits. See id. 
 87 See NITEL III, 850 F.3d at 882. The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that 
Seventh Circuit precedent allows for substantial compliance with Rule 11, and the two letters PNC 
sent NITEL constituted warning-shots that afforded NITEL more than twenty-one days to correct the 
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In NITEL III, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that substantial compliance with 
Rule 11 remains controlling law within the circuit, but stated that PNC’s letters 
did not meet the liberal standard.88 In explaining its decision, the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that merely sending a letter that threatens to seek Rule 11 sanctions 
does not substantially comply with Rule 11.89 
The court specified that the letters PNC sent NITEL did not allow for a 
twenty-one day period to remedy the problems.90 When PNC Bank sent NI-
TEL’s attorney, Robert G. Riffner, a settlement demand prior to discovery, they 
outlined the defects of the allegedly frivolous claim and threatened to seek 
sanctions if Riffner did not dismiss his suit within eight days.91 Similarly, 
PNC’s second settlement demand letter threatened to seek sanctions if Riffner 
did not acquiesce to the settlement demands within six days.92 The court rea-
soned that both of the settlement demand letters did not provide Riffner the 
twenty-one day safe-harbor period required by Rule 11 because they demanded 
acceptance of the settlement offer within five and six days respectively.93 The 
court held that this time period was inadequate and distinguished this situation 
from Seventh Circuit precedent in which the letters threatening to seek sanc-
tions did provide a twenty-one day safe-harbor period.94 Instead, the court de-
termined that PNC was using the letters as leverage and that the letters were 
not sufficient to replace the warning-shot/safe-harbor requirements of Rule 
11.95 Without allowing the twenty-one day safe-harbor period, the settlement 
                                                                                                                           
problems. See N. Ill. Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, NA (NITEL II), No. 12 C 2372, 2015 WL 1943271, 
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2015), rev’d 850 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2017). Thus, according to the district 
court, PNC substantially complied with Rule 11 and deserved a decision on the merits. See id. at *8. 
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court on a procedural basis, however, holding that the letters 
did not substantially comply with Rule 11. See NITEL III, 850 F.3d at 883. 
 88 See NITEL III, 850 F.3d at 888 (declaring that due to the fact that PNC’s letters did not sub-
stantially comply with Rule 11, the court did not need to revisit whether the theory can ever satisfy the 
warning-shot/safe-harbor requirements of Rule 11 at that moment). 
 89 See id. at 888–89 (“PNC Bank was entitled, if it chose, to huff and puff about Rule 11 in its 
settlement demands . . . . [b]ut its posturing did not amount even to substantial compliance . . . .”). 
 90 See id. at 888 (stating that substantial compliance requires a twenty-one-day window to with-
draw the offending matter, which PNC failed to provide). Although PNC didn’t actually file for sanc-
tions within twenty-one days of sending either of their two letters, PNC only provided NITEL five 
days and six days to respond to the letters. See id. 
 91 See id. (explaining that the settlement demand requested a written reply accepting the terms 
within five days, and allowed eight days for Riffner to dismiss the lawsuit). The court assumed that 
the letter adequately explained the defects of the claim, and thus did not review if this complied with 
Rule 11’s requirement that motions for sanctions must explain why the claims in question are frivo-
lous. See id. 
 92 See id. (explaining that PNC’s second settlement demand letter demanded Riffner dismiss the 
lawsuit within five days, and if he did not comply, they would seek Rule 11 sanctions). 
 93 See id. (holding that the settlement demand letters did not substantially comply with Rule 11). 
 94 See id. (“[T]he letters simply did not offer NITEL or Riffner the [twenty-one] day safe harbor 
that was offered in Nisenbaum or Matrix IV.”). 
 95 See id. at 888–89 (explaining that the letters did not substantially comply with Rule 11 because 
they did not afford NITEL a twenty-one-day safe-harbor). 
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demand letters merely amounted to posturing that did not substantially comply 
with Rule 11’s requirements.96 
In NITEL III, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged problems with the sub-
stantial compliance theory, but ultimately determined that it did not need to 
revisit its approach.97 Notably, the court stated that the substantial compliance 
approach was incompatible with the explicit requirements of Rule 11 and the 
approach ran counter to the Advisory Committee Notes.98 Rule 11 requires that 
a motion for sanctions must be made separately from other motions.99 The Ad-
visory Committee Notes further clarify that a separate motion stresses the seri-
ousness of the action and provides a concrete window for the twenty-one day 
safe-harbor period.100 In effect, the Seventh Circuit dispensed with this re-
quirement by allowing informal letters to be sufficient.101 
The court also detailed other circuits’ approaches to the warning-
shot/safe-harbor requirements of Rule 11, but chose not to consider or apply 
those approaches to the issue in NITEL III.102 The court did not reject the other 
circuits approach; indeed, a substantial portion of the court’s decision was 
spent explaining that a strict adherence approach to Rule 11 is the only ap-
proach that was reconcilable with the plain language of the rule.103 Instead, the 
court determined it did not need to revisit its substantial compliance approach 
in this case because PNC did not even meet the generous substantial compli-
ance standard.104 
The dissent, written by Judge Posner, did not attempt to reconcile the sub-
stantial compliance approach with Rule 11’s requirements.105 He acknowl-
edged that circuit precedent allows for substantial compliance and thus limited 
his dissent to whether the facts of NITEL III sufficiently adhere to the circuit’s 
                                                                                                                           
 96 See id. at 888 (implying that without allowing for the twenty-one-day safe-harbor, PNC was 
simply threatening to seek Rule 11 sanctions). 
 97 See id. at 887–88 (outlining the deficiencies of the substantial compliance approach). 
 98 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11; NITEL III, 850 F.3d at 887; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory com-
mittee’s note to 1993 amendment. 
 99 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2) (“A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other 
motion . . . .”). 
 100 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (explaining that Rule 11 
motions for sanctions are serious threats). The Advisory Committee Notes explain that, generally, 
counsel should give an informal notice of their intent to seek sanctions prior to formally serving a 
Rule 11 motion. See id. 
 101 See NITEL III, 850 F.3d at 887 (“Insisting on a formal motion seem[s] unduly formalistic.”). 
 102 See id. at 887–88 (explaining how other circuits approach Rule 11 motions). 
 103 See id. (explaining that the substantial compliance approach to Rule 11 does not account for 
the explicit requirements of the rule). 
 104 See id. at 888 (stating that Riffner did not meet the generous requirements of the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s substantial compliance approach). 
 105 See id. at 889 (remaining silent as to whether substantial compliance is appropriate for Rule 11 
motions for sanctions). 
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allowable approach.106 In light of circuit precedent, Judge Posner believed that 
the facts of NITEL III amounted to PNC substantially complying with Rule 
11.107 He concluded that PNC Bank’s settlement demand letters were analo-
gous to Rule 11 motions for sanctions because they provided Riffner the op-
portunity to correct his allegedly frivolous claims.108 
C. Other Circuit Approaches to Rule 11 
In its analysis, the Seventh Circuit recognized that its sister circuits have 
been critical of the substantial compliance approach to Rule 11.109 For exam-
ple, in 2014, in Penn, LLC v. Prosper Business Development Corp., the Sixth 
Circuit reviewed the circuit split and adopted a strict adherence approach to 
Rule 11.110 A strict adherence approach to Rule 11 requires parties to follow 
the plain language of Rule 11 and satisfy all the requirements of Rule 11.111 In 
its analysis, the Sixth Circuit held that an informal warning was not a substi-
tute for a motion because an informal warning undermined the seriousness of a 
motion for sanctions.112 Further, the court noted that the Seventh Circuit’s sub-
stantial compliance approach contravened Rule 11’s plain language.113 
In 2006, in Roth v. Green, the Tenth Circuit was even more critical of the 
Seventh Circuit’s approach.114 In Roth, the Tenth Circuit noted that Rule 
11(c)(1)(A) required the aggrieved party to serve the offending party with a 
motion, not a letter.115 The court recognized that the Advisory Committee 
Notes explicitly required a formal motion, stating that warning letters did not 
replace formal motions.116 The Tenth Circuit went on to state that the Seventh 
                                                                                                                           
 106 See id. (imposing no judgment on the substantial compliance approach). 
 107 Id. (explaining that PNC provided Riffner with multiple opportunities to correct the allegedly 
frivolous claims). 
 108 See id. (“Although PNC did not serve a formal Rule 11 motion on Riffner prior to filing the 
motion with the court, PNC’s letters were the equivalent of Rule 11 motions . . . .”). 
 109 See id. at 887 (acknowledging that substantial compliance with Rule 11 is incompatible with 
the plain reading Rule 11); see also Penn, LLC, 773 F.3d at 768 (opining that the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision violates the goals of Rule 11). 
 110 See Penn, LLC, 773 F.3d at 768 (noting that only the Seventh Circuit has embraced substantial 
compliance with Rule 11 and that the Seventh Circuit’s decision and rationale to do so has been criti-
cized by the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits). 
 111 See id. (holding that the Sixth Circuit requires strict adherence with Rule 11). 
 112 See id. at 767. The FRCP Advisory Committee Notes echo this sentiment, raising this issue as 
one of the underlying policy reasons for requiring a formal motion. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory com-
mittee’s note to 1993 amendment. 
 113 See Penn, LLC, 773 F.3d at 767. Rule 11 specifically states “[a] motion for sanctions must be 
made separately from any other motion.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2) (emphasis added). 
 114 See Roth v. Green, 466 F.3d 1179, 1191–93 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 115 See id. at 1191–92 (explaining that the text of Rule 11 is clear that only a separate motion is 
sufficient). 
 116 See id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (suggesting that 
informal notice is nothing more than a courtesy). 
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Circuit neglected to cite binding authority to advance its position in support of 
the substantial compliance approach.117 
The Fifth Circuit, in 2008, in In re Pratt, echoed the Tenth Circuit’s anal-
ysis.118 In In re Pratt, the Fifth Circuit held that it was necessary for parties to 
fully comply with the requirements of Rule 11 because of the rule’s plain lan-
guage and Fifth Circuit precedent.119 The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the Sev-
enth Circuit’s approach and held that the substantial compliance approach was 
contrary to Rule 11 and that there was no evidence that congressional intent 
allowed for mere substantial compliance.120 
III. DIFFERENT IS NOT ALWAYS BETTER: WHY THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
SHOULD ADOPT A STRICT ADHERENCE APPROACH TO RULE 11 
In Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A. (“NITEL III”), the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit declined to reconsider whether 
the substantial compliance theory to Rule 11 was appropriate.121 Courts within 
the circuit, however, have acknowledged that the unique approach to Rule 11 is 
likely untenable.122 The Seventh Circuit’s rationale underlying the substantial 
compliance approach is unpersuasive and is irreconcilable with the intent of 
the Advisory Committee.123 By maintaining its approach, the Seventh Circuit 
ignored the plain language and history of Rule 11 and created unnecessary am-
biguities for parties involved in Rule 11 litigation.124 Adopting a strict adher-
ence model would remedy these problems and create uniformity amongst the 
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Roth, 466 F.3d at 1193. The Roth court stated that the reason a motion is necessary is 
because the purpose of the safe-harbor provisions was to “‘protect[] litigants from sanctions whenever 
possible in order to mitigate Rule 11’s chilling effects, formaliz[e] procedural due process considera-
tions . . . . and encourag[e] the withdrawal of papers that violate the rule without involving the district 
court . . . .’” See id. at 1192 (alteration in original) (quoting 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1337.2, at 722 (3d ed. 2004)). 
 118 See In re Pratt, 524 F.3d 580, 586–88 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that parties must strictly adhere 
to the requirements of Rule 11). 
 119 See id. (holding that informal notice is not sufficient). 
 120 See id. at 587–88 (concluding that the Seventh Circuit’s rationale is unpersuasive). 
 121 See N. Ill. Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A. (NITEL III), 850 F.3d 880, 888 n.5 (7th Cir. 
2017) (asserting that reliance on the substantial compliance approach will likely lead to an en banc or 
U.S. Supreme Court review). 
 122 See Knapp v. Evgeros, Inc., No. 15 C 754, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135510, at *5 (N. D. Ill. 
Aug. 24, 2017) (stating that the substantial compliance approach is on “life support” and that the Sev-
enth Circuit came “within a cat’s whisker of overruling it”). 
 123 See NITEL III, 850 F.3d at 887; FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 
amendment. 
 124 See NITEL III, 850 F.3d at 887 (acknowledging that the substantial compliance approach is 
flawed). 
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circuits.125 Section A of this Part examines the shortcomings of the Seventh 
Circuit’s analysis.126 Section B of this Part further explains why a strict adher-
ence approach to Rule 11 better addresses the policy concerns that Rule 11 was 
intended to resolve.127 
A. Problems with the Seventh Circuit’s Analysis 
In June 2003, in Nisenbaum v. Milwaukee County, the Seventh Circuit 
held that substantial compliance with Rule 11 is sufficient.128 In so doing, the 
Seventh Circuit attempted to prevent formalities from interfering with the pur-
pose of Rule 11.129 The court provided no analysis, however, for why this ap-
proach should supersede a strict adherence approach.130 Indeed, although the 
Seventh Circuit recognized that there were legal problems with its approach, 
the court never attempted to justify its rationale against the other circuits’ ap-
proaches.131 
The Seventh Circuit has previously held that the plain language of a stat-
ute should be followed unless it would lead to illogical results.132 In this situa-
tion, the text of Rule 11 is unambiguously clear regarding the procedure neces-
sary to sanction a party.133 The Advisory Committee understood how serious 
motions for sanctions were and specifically amended Rule 11 to reflect this.134 
They created an unambiguously clear rule with a clear policy that the substan-
                                                                                                                           
 125 See Penn, LLC v. Prosper Bus. Dev. Corp., 773 F.3d 764, 768 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting that the 
Seventh Circuit is the only circuit to allow substantial compliance, which undermines the underlying 
policy of Rule 11 and the FRCP in general). 
 126 See infra notes 128–142 and accompanying text. 
 127 See infra notes 143–154 and accompanying text. 
 128 See Nisenbaum v. Milwaukee Cty., 333 F.3d 804, 808 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that the plain-
tiff substantially complied with Rule 11 because the plaintiff notified the defendant of the problem via 
a letter and gave him more than twenty-one days to resolve it). 
 129 See id. (explaining that technical noncompliance should not bar parties from pursuing sanc-
tions). 
 130 See In re Pratt, 524 F.3d 580, 587–88 (5th Cir. 2008) (stating that the Seventh Circuit simply 
asserted that substantial compliance with Rule 11 is sufficient and did not provide any analysis or 
authority in support of its ruling). 
 131 See NITEL III, 850 F.3d at 887 (conceding problems with the substantial compliance approach 
to Rule 11). 
 132 See Busse v. Comm’r, 479 F.2d 1147, 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1973) (holding that a statute’s 
plain language can be overlooked if the result would be irrational and if congressional intent suggests 
otherwise). This principle has been entrenched in U.S. Supreme Court case law since the nineteenth 
century. See, e.g., Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 462 (1892) (“Where the intent 
is plain, nothing is left to construction.”). 
 133 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2) (explicitly stating that a motion for sanctions must be made sepa-
rately from other motions and must afford the opposing party a twenty-one-day safe-harbor). 
 134 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (“To stress the serious-
ness of a motion for sanctions and to define precisely the conduct claimed to violate the rule, the revi-
sion provides that the ‘safe harbor’ period begins to run only upon service of the motion.”). 
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tial compliance approach undermines.135 In light of the fact that sanctions were 
not used frequently enough under the original implementation of Rule 11, and 
the 1993 amendments were an overcorrection that caused too many motions 
for sanctions, the substantial compliance approach is simply inadequate.136 By 
inconsistently applying when the plain language of the FRCP should be fol-
lowed and when it can be disregarded, the Seventh Circuit is sending mixed 
signals to parties involved in both current and future litigation about how to 
interpret the FRCP.137 
Although Judge Posner dissented from this opinion, he did not tackle 
whether the substantial compliance approach is the appropriate theory for Rule 
11 motions.138 He merely stated that circuit precedent allows for such an ap-
proach, and within the facts of NITEL III, Riffner substantially complied with 
the rule.139 This is a fair assessment of the case, but also demonstrates the in-
adequacy of practically applying the substantial compliance approach.140 
Without clear guidance as to what constitutes substantial compliance, the rule 
is left vague and ineffective.141 This too undermines the policy behind the rule 
because parties will not know if a letter threatening sanctions is merely a threat 
or an effective Rule 11 motion for sanctions.142 
B. Accounting for More: A Strict Adherence Approach Addresses Policy 
Concerns that the Strict Compliance Approach Ignores 
A substantial compliance approach ignores the plain language of the 
FRCP and the Advisory Committee Notes.143 In pertinent part, Rule 11 states 
                                                                                                                           
 135 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2); FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amend-
ment (explaining the policy behind Rule 11). 
 136 See Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 589, 598 (1998) (ex-
plaining how the 1983 amendments led to an abundance of motions for sanctions and eventually led to 
the 1993 amendments). 
 137 Compare United States v. Webber, 536 F.3d 584, 593 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the plain 
language of a statute takes precedent), with Nisenbaum, 333 F.3d at 808 (holding that a party must 
merely substantially comply with Rule 11 and does not need to follow its plain language). 
 138 See NITEL III, 850 F.3d at 889 (Posner, J., dissenting) (stating that the Seventh Circuit allows 
for substantial compliance, but not defending the court’s reasoning or delving into the court’s analysis 
regarding if the approach is appropriate). 
 139 See id. (“Our court has held that ‘substantial compliance’ with the rule is sufficient. And this 
case is a good example of substantial compliance . . . .”) (citations omitted). 
 140 See id. (demonstrating that in practice, it is difficult to determine what constitutes substantial 
compliance). 
 141 See id. 888–89 (majority opinion) (showing that parties might assume they have substantially 
complied with Rule 11, but courts might hold otherwise). 
 142 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (explaining there is a 
difference between threatening sanctions and actually filing a motion to sanction a party). 
 143 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (stating the requirements for Rule 11); Penn, LLC, 773 F.3d at 768 
(explaining that the substantial compliance approach is inadequate); FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory 
committee’s note to 1993 amendment (providing insight into why Rule 11 was amended). The plain 
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that a motion for sanctions must be made separately from other motions and 
must describe the alleged wrongful conduct.144 The motion must be served to 
the opposing party, and the moving party must afford the opposing party at 
least twenty-one days to withdraw or correct the challenged item.145 The Advi-
sory Committee Notes expand on this, stating that the rule for sanctions re-
quires a separate motion to stress the seriousness of the sanctions.146 The re-
quirement of serving a motion removes the uncertainty of whether the party is 
serious about pursuing sanctions.147 By dispensing with the formal require-
ments, the Seventh Circuit undermines the underlying policy rationales of Rule 
11.148 
On the other hand, a strict adherence approach to Rule 11 resolves prob-
lems that arise with the substantial compliance approach.149 Although it is true 
that litigants would be subject to a more rigid set of rules under strict adher-
ence, the litigants would also know with greater certainty whether they are 
abiding by the rules.150 NITEL III illustrates this problem: due to the ambigui-
ties of what constitutes substantial compliance with Rule 11, the Seventh Cir-
cuit has heard several cases questioning its approach, and the issue continues 
to cause confusion even amongst judges.151 If there is confusion as to how to 
                                                                                                                           
language of a statute is important because giving judges’ discretion to formulate their own laws in-
creases political discourse and encroaches on the responsibilities of the other branches of govern-
ments. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 4, 5 (2012). It is a judge’s responsi-
bility to apply the law, not create it. See id. at 5. Even when interpreting the plain language of a stat-
ute, however, the context behind the language is important. See Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary Statu-
tory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative Intent and History, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1615 (2014) 
(“Text, without context, can be radically indeterminate . . . .”). Within the boundaries of Rule 11, it 
seems that the context of the rule points to a plain language reading. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory 
committee’s note to 1993 amendment (explaining that Rule 11 requires a separate, formal motion). 
 144 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2). 
 145 Id. 
 146 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. The Advisory Commit-
tee comments that although it is polite for attorneys to give informal notices, they are not meant to 
replace a formal motion. See id.; see also Penn, LLC, 773 F.3d at 767; Roth v. Green, 466 F.3d 1179, 
1192 (10th Cir. 2006) (declaring that the Advisory Committee did not intend for warning letters to 
replace motions). 
 147 See Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that it runs counter to the 
language and purpose of Rule 11 to allow informal warnings as substitutes for motions). Even the 
Seventh Circuit acknowledged that a formal motion is the only way to sufficiently impress the seri-
ousness of the sanctions request. See NITEL III, 850 F.3d at 888. 
 148 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11; Penn, LLC, 773 F.3d at 767–68; FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory commit-
tee’s note to 1993 amendment. 
 149 See Penn, LLC, 773 F.3d at 767–68 (implying that a strict adherence approach satisfies the 
plain language of Rule 11 and sufficiently warns parties of the seriousness of the motion for sanc-
tions). 
 150 See id. (“[A] letter prompts the recipient to guess at his opponent’s seriousness.”). 
 151 Compare NITEL III, 850 F.3d at 886 (concluding that because PNC did not comply with the 
warning-shot/safe-harbor provision, it did not substantially comply with Rule 11), with id. at 889 
(Posner, J., dissenting) (concluding that PNC’s letters substantially complied with Rule 11 under Sev-
enth Circuit precedent). 
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comply with Rule 11, it might deter the formulation of innovative arguments, 
thus having the opposite intended effect of the rule.152 Further, a strict adher-
ence approach saves judicial resources because a court would not need to un-
dertake an in-depth analysis to see if the facts of a particular case substantially 
comply with the rule.153 The FRCP should be administered in a “just, speedy, 
and inexpensive manner,” and this goal can be achieved more efficiently by 
requiring a strict set of rules. 154 
CONCLUSION 
In 2017, in Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, NA (“NITEL 
III”), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit declined to revisit its 
substantial compliance approach to Rule 11. Due to the fact that the court nev-
er defined the methodology behind the substantial compliance approach, the 
court has had to hear numerous cases to carve out its boundaries. NITEL III 
shows how the uncertainty of what may constitute substantial compliance can 
create confusion to litigators. Further, the substantial compliance approach un-
dermines the policy goals of Rule 11 and ignores the plain language of the 
rule. A strict adherence approach better serves the function of Rule 11 and is 
the only method that can be reconciled with the language of the rule. There-
fore, the Seventh Circuit should forgo its substantial compliance theory and 
adopt a strict adherence approach to Rule 11. 
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